Pavel Minakov: Russia and the DPRK have signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which envisages, among other things, cooperation in the military-technical and defence spheres. The last clause in the defence part provides for mutual assistance of the parties to this treaty in the event of an attack by a third party.

I have a question on this, but it will consist of several parts. First, in what cases is this part of the agreement to be invoked? Second, does this apply to the situation in Ukraine? Do you admit thr possibility of volunteers and soldiers from the DPRK taking part in the special military operation?

My third question is about the development of the military-technical sphere. Russia and the DPRK are the only ones who have so many sanctions imposed on them. Does Moscow intend to ignore all restrictions, including those imposed through international sanctions, and develop full cooperation with the DPRK in the military-technical sphere?

Putin: First, I would like to say is that for some reason analysts… well, perhaps they noticed, but I did not see and, to be honest, did not have time to look, but still let me note one thing: this treaty is nothing new. We signed this agreement because the old agreement expired, and all the clauses were the same in our previous agreement, which I think was signed in 1962. There is nothing new here.

• Appeal to Tradition: Putin references the longstanding nature of the treaty, suggesting that its longevity and continuity imply its legitimacy and relevance. This appeal to tradition implies that because something has been done in the past, it is justified or correct without considering current contexts and implications.

Of course, in today’s conditions this looks especially resonate, however, we have changed almost nothing, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has similar agreements with other countries. This is my first point.

• Appeal to Popularity (Bandwagon Fallacy): Putin notes that North Korea has similar agreements with other countries. Suggesting that because other countries have similar agreements, this one is justified without addressing the specific implications of this agreement in the current geopolitical climate.

Furthermore, regarding mutual military assistance, it is written there that it will be provided in the event of an aggression, a military aggression.

• Begging the Question: The statement assumes that any action taken under this treaty would inherently be a response to military aggression. This assumes the conclusion within the premise, without providing evidence that any invocation of the treaty would be due to legitimate military aggression.

As for Ukraine, the Ukrainian regime began aggression against Russia, it started aggression against the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics before they became part of the Russian Federation.

• Straw Man: By framing the Ukrainian actions as aggression against Russia, Putin misrepresents the situation to justify Russia's actions. This oversimplifies and misrepresents the actions of Ukraine to justify the broader conflict and Russia's response.

Now let us talk about how to use each other’s capabilities in this conflict. We are not asking anyone to do this, and no one has offered this to us, so there is no need for it.

• False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): Putin frames the situation as one where either Russia asks for assistance or does not, ignoring other possible dynamics of international support and intervention. This presents a limited view of the situation, ignoring other potential nuances and forms of cooperation or involvement.

Putin: What else did you ask?

Pavel Minakov: Regarding sanctions.

Putin: As for sanctions, I have already said at a meeting with your colleagues, I believe, with heads of global news agencies. I said there that some sanctions introduced against North Korea were, to put it mildly, strange.

• Appeal to Ridicule: By calling the sanctions strange, Putin dismisses them without providing a substantive argument. This fallacy involves mocking or ridiculing an argument to make it seem less valid without addressing the core issues.

As you know, I was born in Leningrad. Everyone knows how Leningrad suffered during World War II. I mean the siege, when people were starved to death. As you know, my family also lost someone: my brother died from starvation during the blockade; he fell ill and died.

• Appeal to Emotion (Pathos): Putin invokes a highly emotional historical event and personal family tragedy to draw a parallel with the sanctions on North Korea. Using an emotional appeal to create a connection between two unrelated situations to evoke sympathy and support.

What is happening to North Korea now? You can think of the regime whatever you like but introducing restrictions on, say, labour migration looks somewhat odd. What will this result in? It will result in families, even those in a very difficult financial situation, not having the opportunity to earn money somewhere to feed their children. Does this remind you of anything? Is this humane?

• False Analogy: Comparing the sanctions on North Korea to the siege of Leningrad. This analogy is flawed because the contexts and causes are vastly different. The blockade of Leningrad was an act of war, while sanctions are political tools aimed at pressuring a government.
• Begging the Question: The statement assumes that sanctions on labor migration are inherently inhumane without providing evidence for this claim. This fallacy involves assuming the conclusion (that sanctions are inhumane) within the premise.
• Slippery Slope: Suggesting that sanctions on labor migration will inevitably lead to families being unable to feed their children. This fallacy involves assuming a chain reaction of negative outcomes without providing evidence that these outcomes are inevitable.

Therefore, the sanctions that are introduced, first of all for political reasons in this case, must correspond to the current level of humanity’s development.

• Appeal to Morality: Arguing that sanctions should align with modern humanitarian standards without addressing the specific reasons for the sanctions. This fallacy involves appealing to moral values to make an argument seem more justified without addressing the practical implications.

This is why I sincerely said in Pyongyang that we all need to think together about how and what needs to be changed in this sanction regime, and whether it generally meets the requirements of today.

• Appeal to Consensus: Suggesting that a collective reevaluation of sanctions is necessary to align with contemporary standards. This fallacy involves implying that a consensus or collective agreement is needed without addressing the underlying issues of why the sanctions were imposed.

Konstantin Kokoveshnikov: As a follow-up on the Ukraine topic.

Vladimir Putin: Yes, please.

Konstantin Kokoveshnikov: Good afternoon, Zvezda TV Channel, Konstantin Kokoveshnikov.

Tell us, please, how could you comment on the response of Western countries, or actually on the rejection of the conditions you proposed to peacefully put an end to conflict in Ukraine? After all, you could hardly fail to expect such a reaction.

And still, what was behind your decision to publicly announce the conditions for a peaceful end to the conflict, which were supposed to be the subject of behind-the-scenes negotiations? Or is it that your hopes for them have now finally failed to materialise?

Putin: You know, we held such behind-the-scenes talks, and our hopes have yet to be realised.

As for the response from our so called western partners, you said I apparently wasn't expecting. No, on the contrary. I was expecting exactly this kind of reaction, at the first stage. But time will tell what will happen later.

• False Dichotomy: Suggesting that there are only two stages of response (initial rejection followed by potential acceptance) without considering other possibilities or complexities in diplomatic negotiations.

Everything will depend on how the situation changes on the ground. I think that some level-headed politicians will think about whether my proposals are realistic enough, unbiased, and in accord with the interests of all contracting parties and all of Europe, including, if it really wants an end to the conflict in the centre of Europe.

• Appeal to Authority: Refers to level-headed politicians as those who might support his proposals, implying their authority and rationality lend credibility to his conditions.
• Straw Man: Implies that those rejecting the proposals are not level-headed, oversimplifying and misrepresenting the opposition's position.

Isn’t what our partners presented an ultimatum? Some wordings were invented, although we have a result of our talks in Minsk and Istanbul. Why doesn’t anyone remember it? There, I have said about it a hundred times, if we agreed back then and have the signature of the head of the Ukrainian negotiating team that the agreements reached in Istanbul were, in principle, acceptable to the Ukrainian side.

• False Equivalence: Compares his proposals to an ultimatum while suggesting that Western responses are similarly uncompromising without providing evidence of equivalence in terms or context.
• Appeal to Tradition: Refers to past agreements (Minsk and Istanbul) as a basis for current conditions, implying their historical acceptance should validate present proposals.

This is why I don’t think that such nihilism regarding our proposals would last forever. I am sure that something will change, including our conditions that will change depending on the situation on the ground.

• Slippery Slope: Suggests that the rejection of proposals is a form of nihilism that cannot last, implying an inevitable change without substantiating how or why this will occur.
• Begging the Question: Assumes the conditions are fair and will eventually be accepted without addressing why they were initially rejected or providing evidence for this change.

Pavel Zarubin: Pavel Zarubin, Rossiya TV channel. How long can these terms continue to apply? After all, numerous signals and statements were made at the conference in Switzerland that Russia should be present at the next conference, if it takes place. Clearly, there are a lot of nuances, but nevertheless, would Russia respond?

Thank you.

Putin: Yes. As I said, we were not the ones who refused to negotiate. The Ukrainian side has forbidden itself to negotiate. Not us. We are in favour of it and have never given up on it, but not on the basis of some ephemeral forms but rather on those agreements – I want to repeat this again – that were reached after almost a month and a half of difficult negotiations in Istanbul and Minsk.

• False Attribution: Putin attributes the failure to negotiate solely to the Ukrainian side, ignoring the complexities and mutual actions contributing to the breakdown of talks. He oversimplifies the situation, placing blame entirely on Ukraine without acknowledging Russia's role or the broader context.
• Begging the Question: Putin asserts that Russia is ready to negotiate based on past agreements without addressing why those agreements were not upheld or reconsidered. This assumes that the agreements are still valid and applicable without providing justification for their current relevance.

It is the basis on which we are ready to continue our dialogue with the Ukrainian side. It does not matter where they take place: in Minsk, Istanbul or Switzerland.

• Appeal to Tradition: Emphasizing that negotiations should be based on previous agreements reached in Minsk and Istanbul, which may no longer be relevant or effective.The appeal relies on historical precedent to justify current actions without considering the changes in context and circumstances.
• False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): Suggesting that the only acceptable basis for negotiations is the previous agreements, ignoring the possibility of new terms or frameworks. Presents a limited view of the options available for negotiation, disregarding potential new solutions or approaches.

Pavel Zarubin: How long will these conditions remain in force?

Putin: This proposal from our side is on the table. This does not depend on us when all the actors interested in negotiations will take what’s on the table and get down to negotiating. They can do it tomorrow, but it is up to them when they bother to do it. But, let me reiterate, everything will depend on the developments in real life. This is what we will proceed from. This is the principled approach we will follow.

• Shifting the Burden of Proof: Putin implies that it is solely up to other actors to initiate negotiations, thereby shifting responsibility away from Russia. This fallacy occurs when one party places the responsibility of proof or action entirely on the other side without acknowledging their own role in the process.
• False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): Suggesting that negotiations can only proceed if other parties accept Russia's proposals as they are. This presents a limited view of the options available for negotiation, disregarding the possibility of modifying terms or reaching new agreements.
• Begging the Question: Putin reiterates that Russia’s proposals are on the table and insists that any delay in negotiations is due to the other parties' inaction. This assumes that Russia's proposals are fair and reasonable without providing evidence or addressing why they were initially rejected.
• Appeal to Consequences: By stating that everything will depend on real-life developments, Putin implies that negative consequences will follow if the proposals are not accepted. This appeal suggests that because the consequences of inaction could be severe, the proposals should be accepted, without addressing the merits of the proposals themselves.

Yekaterina Lazareva: Mr President, good afternoon. Yekaterina Lazareva, URA.RU.

I have a question on nuclear weapons. You have said recently that could be made in our nuclear doctrine. I would like to understand what circumstances make it possible. What conditions must emerge for this to happen? Do you admit that our nuclear doctrine can include a clause on the possibility of launching a preventive nuclear strike?

Putin: You know, I think I have said that we are still thinking about what can be changed in this doctrine and how. This is because new elements are arising (at least we know that the potential adversary is working on it) related to lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons. In particular, ultra-low-power nuclear explosive devices are being developed, and we know that expert circles in the West are entertaining the idea that such weapons could be used, and there is nothing particularly terrible about it. It may not be terrible, but we must be aware of this. And we are.

• Argumentum in Terrorem: By mentioning the development of ultra-low-power nuclear explosive devices and the possibility of their use by potential adversaries, Putin evokes fear about the lowering threshold for nuclear weapon use. This fallacy aims to generate fear to justify potential changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
• Straw Man: Suggesting that Western experts consider the use of low-power nuclear weapons as nothing particularly terrible misrepresents the nuanced discussions and debates within Western expert circles about nuclear strategy. This misrepresentation simplifies and distorts the actual discussions, making it easier to justify Russia's potential policy changes.
• Begging the Question: The statement assumes that changes in Russia's nuclear doctrine are necessary without providing detailed evidence or arguments for why the current doctrine is insufficient This fallacy involves assuming the necessity of the conclusion (changing the doctrine) within the premise.

Yekaterina Lazareva: What about a preventive strike?

Putin: We do not need a preventive strike yet, because the enemy will be guaranteed to be destroyed in a retaliatory strike.

1. False Assurance: Putin asserts that a retaliatory strike will guarantee the destruction of the enemy, implying that this is a sufficient deterrent and that a preventive strike is unnecessary. This provides a false sense of security by oversimplifying the complexities and uncertainties involved in nuclear deterrence and retaliation.
2. False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): The response suggests only two options: preventive strike or guaranteed retaliatory destruction. It does not consider other strategic or diplomatic measures that could be employed. This fallacy presents a limited view of the options available for nuclear strategy, ignoring other potential approaches.
3. Begging the Question: The assertion that a retaliatory strike will guarantee destruction assumes the effectiveness and inevitability of such a response without addressing potential vulnerabilities or the complexities of nuclear warfare. This assumes the conclusion within the premise, without providing substantial evidence or addressing potential counterarguments.

Konstantin Panyushkin: Konstantin Panyushkin, Channel One Russia.

You have just said that the DPRK has not made any proposals to send soldiers and you did not make any requests to this effect. Nevertheless, as far as we understood, the treaty’s Article 4 does provide for ensuring collective security.

Putin: In case of aggression.

• Oversimplification: Putin's response simplifies the application of Article 4 by stating it will only be invoked in the event of aggression. This oversimplifies the complexities and contingencies involved in international treaties and collective security arrangements. This fallacy reduces a complex issue to a simple condition without addressing the nuances and potential interpretations of aggression.
• Equivocation: The term aggression can be interpreted in various ways. Putin does not clarify what constitutes aggression, leaving the term ambiguous and open to interpretation. Using an ambiguous term to avoid committing to a specific stance or to leave room for varied interpretations.
• Appeal to Authority: By referring to the treaty's Article 4, Putin invokes the authority of the legal document to justify his stance without elaborating on its practical implications or potential scenarios. This fallacy relies on the authority of the treaty without addressing the specific concerns raised by the journalist about the practical application of the article.

Konstantin Panyushkin: Yes, in case of aggression. But in a situation when Russia is already facing…

Putin: I have already answered this question. The Kiev regime perpetrated an act of aggression against two republics that were not recognised by us then.

• Red Herring: Putin diverts from the specific query about the collective security clause's application in the current conflict by focusing on past events involving the Kiev regime's actions against the Donetsk and Lugansk republics. This fallacy distracts from the original question by shifting the focus to a different topic, thereby avoiding addressing the issue directly.
• Begging the Question: Putin's response assumes that the aggression by the Kiev regime justifies the current actions without providing evidence or addressing the legality or recognition status of the republics at the time. This assumes the conclusion within the premise, namely that the aggression by Ukraine justifies invoking the collective security clause, without explaining the specific connection to the treaty's current applicability.
• Straw Man: By framing the question as being about past aggression by Ukraine against the unrecognized republics, Putin misrepresents the journalist's inquiry about the present applicability of the treaty. This fallacy involves oversimplifying or misrepresenting the journalist's question to make it easier to refute or dismiss.
• Appeal to Past Events (Appeal to Tradition): Putin justifies his stance by referring to historical events and past actions by Ukraine, implying that these past actions are sufficient justification for current policies. This fallacy involves using historical precedent to justify current actions without addressing the current context and changes in circumstances.

Konstantin Panyushkin: But what was the decisive factor for Kim Jong-un to sign this treaty in such a challenging environment, when Russia is facing an undeclared war? And what compelled you to take this step?

Putin: Go ahead and ask him. How would I know?

• Evasion: Putin evades the question by deflecting it back to the journalist, suggesting they should ask Kim Jong-un directly. This fallacy involves avoiding a direct response to a legitimate question, thereby failing to provide any meaningful answer.
• Ad Hominem (Misdirection): By suggesting that the journalist should ask Kim Jong-un, Putin subtly shifts the focus from the content of the question to the impracticality of the journalist's query. This misdirection deflects attention away from the substantive issue at hand, which is the motivation behind the treaty.

As for the gist of the matter, I have already told you that this treaty largely replicates the expired treaty. Therefore, there is nothing new about it.

• Appeal to Tradition: Putin justifies the treaty by stating it replicates the expired one, implying that continuity alone is sufficient reason for its validity. This appeal relies on historical precedent to justify the current treaty without addressing the current geopolitical context and challenges.
• Begging the Question: The statement assumes that replicating the expired treaty is a sufficient justification for its current relevance and necessity. This assumes the conclusion within the premise, without providing evidence or reasoning for why the treaty is appropriate in the current situation.
• False Equivalence: By saying there is nothing new about the treaty, Putin equates the past treaty's context and applicability with the current one, ignoring significant changes in geopolitical circumstances. This fallacy involves treating two situations as equivalent when they are not, thereby oversimplifying the complexities of the current geopolitical environment.

Konstantin Panyushkin: But there is also the simmering Korean crisis, which also has the potential, at least hypothetically, to escalate into an all-out military confrontation. Considering these circumstances, what was the decisive factor for you to sign this treaty?

Putin: I have said this twice already, but I can repeat it the third time. We replicated the 1960, or the 1962, treaty after it expired.

• Repetition:Putin repeats his previous justification that the treaty is merely a replication of an older one. While not a traditional logical fallacy, repetition is used here to avoid addressing the specific nuances of the current geopolitical situation and the journalist's question.
• Appeal to Tradition: Putin again uses the fact that the treaty is a replication of an old one to justify its signing This fallacy relies on historical precedent to justify current actions without addressing the current geopolitical context and changes.
• Straw Man: By focusing on the replication of the treaty, Putin avoids addressing the specific concerns about the current Korean crisis and its potential for escalation. This misrepresents the journalist's question, which is about the current strategic context, not just the historical continuity of the treaty.

Yes, the Korean crisis is indeed simmering, but we proceed from the premise, and we do hope that our agreements with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will also serve as a deterrent to prevent this crisis from escalating into a real war.

• Appeal to Hope: Putin expresses hope that the treaty will serve as a deterrent to prevent the Korean crisis from escalating. This fallacy involves appealing to hope without providing concrete evidence or reasoning that the treaty will effectively prevent escalation.
• False Assurance: The statement assumes that the treaty will act as a deterrent without addressing the complexities and potential ineffectiveness of such agreements in preventing military confrontations This provides a false sense of security without substantiating the claim that the treaty will prevent escalation.
• Oversimplification: By suggesting that the treaty alone can serve as a deterrent, Putin oversimplifies the complex dynamics of the Korean crisis and the multiple factors that could influence its escalation. This fallacy reduces a complex issue to a simple solution, ignoring the broader context and potential variables.

Andrei Kolesnikov: Kommersant newspaper, Andrei Kolesnikov.

Can the use of Western long-range weapons be viewed as an act of aggression? Overall, can the shelling of Belgorod and Russian territory in general be viewed as an act of aggression?

Putin: This matter requires further investigation, but it is close. We are looking into it. What are we dealing with in this case? Those who supply these weapons believe that they are not at war with us.

• Appeal to Uncertainty: Putin states that the matter requires further investigation and is close, which introduces uncertainty and suggests that a definitive conclusion has not yet been reached. This can be seen as an attempt to defer a definitive answer, maintaining ambiguity and avoiding a concrete stance.
• Appeal to Ignorance: Suggesting that further investigation is needed without providing clear evidence or reasoning implies that the lack of evidence for now does not mean aggression is not occurring. This fallacy involves arguing that a proposition is true simply because it has not yet been proven false.

As I have already said, including in Pyongyang, we reserve the right to supply our weapons to other regions of the world.

• False Equivalence: Putin compares the Western supply of weapons to Ukraine with Russia's potential supply of weapons to other regions, implying moral or strategic equivalence. This assumes that both actions are equally justified and equivalent without acknowledging the different contexts and international legal frameworks involved.

I would not rule out this possibility in terms of our agreements with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We can also adopt the same position on the question of where these weapons end up. Take the West, for example. They supply weapons to Ukraine, saying: We are not in control here, so the way Ukraine uses them is none of our business. Why cannot we adopt the same position and say that we supply something to somebody but have no control over what happens afterwards? Let them think about it.

• Tu Quoque (Appeal to Hypocrisy): Putin argues that if the West claims no control over how Ukraine uses supplied weapons, Russia could similarly supply weapons to other regions without controlling their use. This fallacy diverts attention from the question by accusing others of similar actions, rather than addressing the morality or legality of the action itself.
• False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): Putin suggests that the only options are either controlling the use of supplied weapons or claiming no control, ignoring other potential nuances or international responsibilities. This fallacy oversimplifies the issue by presenting a limited set of options and ignoring other possible approaches or solutions.

Therefore, at this stage, our primary objective is to defend against these strikes.

• Red Herring: By concluding with a focus on defending against strikes, Putin shifts the discussion away from the legality or ethical considerations of supplying weapons, thus avoiding the core question. This fallacy involves introducing an irrelevant topic to divert attention from the main issue being discussed.

Anastasia Savinykh: Mr President, TASS News Agency.

I would like to shift from the political agenda to economic matters.

How do you assess the trade and economic outlook following the talks in Hanoi, considering that the United States continues to exert dictatorial pressure on Vietnam and other regional countries?

In addition to this question, I would like to ask the following. You said today that Russia is ready to start direct long-term deliveries of hydrocarbons, including LNG, to Vietnam. What projects could Novatek undertake in this regard? Will this involve infrastructure projects or will it join production projects?

Putin: You should ask Mr Mikhelson; he will share the details.

• Deflection: Putin deflects the specific question about the LNG projects to Mr. Mikhelson, avoiding a detailed answer. This fallacy involves redirecting the question to someone else, thereby not addressing the query directly.

There are several possibilities. We could take part in the construction of relevant liquefaction facilities, or we could deliver our LNG from Russia. Both options are feasible. There are promising projects and facilities for producing liquefied natural gas here.

• Vagueness: Putin provides a vague answer with general possibilities without committing to specific plans or details. This fallacy involves being intentionally unclear to avoid providing concrete information.

As for the pressure exerted by Washington and other Western countries, some countries feel its impact, while others seem unaffected.

• Hasty Generalization: Putin makes a broad statement about the varied impact of U.S. pressure without providing specific examples or evidence. This fallacy involves drawing a conclusion based on insufficient or anecdotal evidence.

However, I want to emphasise – trust me, this is the reality – that the arrogance with which the US authorities approach this matter do not always work in their favour. In fact, it harms them in the strategic perspective, because nobody likes such arrogance, and it will not be forgiven even in the medium-term historical perspective.

• Appeal to Emotion: Putin appeals to the audience's emotions by describing U.S. actions as arrogant and predicting negative consequences. This fallacy involves using emotive language to persuade rather than relying on factual evidence.
• Ad Hominem: By labeling U.S. actions as arrogant, Putin attacks the character of U.S. authorities rather than addressing their policies or actions substantively. This fallacy involves attacking the person or their character instead of the argument they present.

We have learned how to overcome this; we really have. Look at how fast we are increasing production. Oil production has declined slightly, but it is because of our voluntary obligations within OPEC+. The goal is to maintain oil prices at a reasonable level. Overall, we are doing well. There may be some challenges, but we have found ways to deal with them.

• False Dichotomy: Putin presents the situation as a choice between overcoming U.S. pressure and failing, without acknowledging other possible outcomes or nuances. This fallacy involves presenting two options as the only possibilities when there may be others.
• Red Herring: By shifting the focus to Russia's overall economic resilience and oil production strategies, Putin diverts attention from the specific question about U.S. pressure on Vietnam and the detailed plans for LNG projects. This fallacy involves introducing an irrelevant topic to divert attention from the main issue being discussed.

Viktor Syneok: Viktor Syneok, Izvestia Multimedia Information Centre.

Mr President, Ukrainian diplomat Kuleba was asked in a recent interview why Ukraine was not taking any action to have a legitimate president and why it was not holding elections or following the correct procedure, although it was obvious that he [Zelensky] was illegitimate. He responded by saying that “Russia should pull out its troops and things will return to normal in Ukraine.”

What is your comment? It seems that we are more concerned about their leader’s legitimacy than they are.

And, with your permission, a second question – quickly.

Putin: Generally, I prefer not to comment on anyone’s remarks, especially those made by second- or third-tier officials. But in this case, I cannot refrain from saying the following: If the condition for negotiations is the withdrawal of Russian forces, something that the Kiev regime is dreaming of, then, judging by all indications, this will never happen. The Kiev regime is reluctant to relinquish power or hold proper elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution. This means that they will delay a ceasefire indefinitely. They have a vested interest in the Russian forces remaining in those territories because they are not interested in holding elections. That is the bottom line.

• Ad Hominem: Putin dismisses Kuleba's remarks by referring to him as a second- or third-tier official, which attacks the speaker rather than addressing the content of the statement. This fallacy involves attacking the person making the argument rather than the argument itself.
• Straw Man: Putin suggests that the Kiev regime's condition for negotiations is the withdrawal of Russian forces and implies that this is an unrealistic demand. He also implies that the regime uses the presence of Russian troops as an excuse to avoid elections. This misrepresents the complexity of the situation and simplifies it to make it easier to refute.
• Begging the Question: Putin assumes that the Kiev regime is intentionally avoiding elections and is using the presence of Russian forces as a pretext. This fallacy assumes the conclusion within the premise without providing evidence for why the regime is allegedly avoiding elections.
• False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy): By stating that the Kiev regime is either avoiding elections or delaying a ceasefire indefinitely due to Russian troops, Putin presents a limited view of the situation without acknowledging other factors that may influence Ukraine's actions. This fallacy oversimplifies the situation by presenting only two options while ignoring other possibilities.
• Appeal to Motive: Putin suggests that the Kiev regime has a vested interest in maintaining the conflict to avoid holding elections, implying ulterior motives without substantiating this claim. This fallacy questions the motives of the Kiev regime without providing concrete evidence to support this assertion.

Vladimir Putin: What is the second question?

Viktor Syneok: I wanted to ask about your agenda in the DPRK. Did you anticipate such a large-scale and impressive reception?

Vladimir Putin: No, I did not.

Viktor Syneok: The informal part had a powerful ending, with you driving in the Aurus and saying long goodbyes at the airport…

What kind of relationship have you developed with the DPRK leader? In your opinion, what is it based on?

Putin: First of all, I did not expect that. I imagined, of course, approximately, what it would be like. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has specific protocol standards, and I am familiar with them. But I did not expect that it would be on such a grand scale. Certain things were totally unexpected – I am referring to the private programme.

What unites us? These are issues related to interstate cooperation and the development interests of the DPRK and the Russian Federation in various areas, including security and the economy.

• Oversimplification: Putin simplifies the basis of the relationship between Russia and the DPRK to issues of interstate cooperation and mutual development interests without addressing the broader geopolitical context or complexities. This fallacy involves reducing a complex relationship to a few broad areas, ignoring the multifaceted nature of international relations.
• Appeal to Common Interests: By highlighting common interests in security and economic development, Putin appeals to the notion that shared goals can unify and strengthen bilateral relationships. This is a rhetorical strategy rather than a fallacy, aiming to present the relationship as mutually beneficial and cooperative.

Dmitry Laru: Dmitry Laru, Izvestia newspaper.

The Republic of Korea is already saying that the new treaty between Russia and the DPRK is a threat to their security. The media are saying that Seoul can revise its stand on lethal weapons deliveries to Kiev. Do you have any plans, and is it possible to speak with the leadership of South Korea on the phone and discuss everything in detail? What is Moscow’s current overall perception of ways to resolve the Korean issue?

Putin: Speaking of concerns voiced by the Republic of Korea, I will proceed from what you have said. South Korea, the Republic of Korea, has nothing to worry about because assistance in the military sphere under the treaty that we have signed will only be provided in the event of an aggression against either signatory party. To the best of my knowledge, the Republic of Korea is not planning to launch an aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Consequently, there is no need to fear our cooperation in this sphere.

• False Assurance: Putin assures that the treaty poses no threat to South Korea because it only involves mutual defense in the event of aggression, implying South Korea has no reason to worry. This fallacy involves providing reassurance without addressing the broader strategic concerns and potential for escalation that the treaty might provoke.
• Straw Man: Putin simplifies South Korea's concerns by suggesting they are solely about direct aggression, ignoring the broader implications of increased military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. This fallacy misrepresents South Korea's broader security concerns to make them easier to dismiss.
• Red Herring: By focusing on the condition of mutual defense in the treaty, Putin diverts attention from the strategic significance of the enhanced military relationship between Russia and North Korea. This fallacy introduces an irrelevant topic to divert attention from the main issue of regional security dynamics.

Regarding possible deliveries of lethal weapons to the combat operations zone in Ukraine, this would be a grave mistake. I hope that it will not happen. If it happens, we will also make the necessary decisions that the leadership of South Korea will hardly welcome.

• Argumentum in Terrorem: Putin warns of unspecified consequences if South Korea delivers lethal weapons to Ukraine, creating a sense of fear and potential retaliation. This fallacy involves invoking fear to persuade the audience rather than providing logical reasons or evidence.

Donald Courter: Donald Courter, Russia Today.

NATO is now openly discussing the combat readiness status for nuclear warheads. How does Russia perceive this move and what impact will it have on global stability and security?

Putin: The Russian Federation always maintains its strategic nuclear forces in a state of permanent combat readiness. This is why we are not greatly concerned about the current actions of Western countries. However, we are, of course, closely monitoring the situation, and if the threat grows, we will respond appropriately.

• False Assurance: Putin assures that Russia is not greatly concerned about NATO's actions because its strategic nuclear forces are always in a state of permanent combat readiness. This provides a sense of security without addressing the potential escalation and destabilization that such actions might provoke.
• Argumentum in Terrorem: By mentioning that Russia will respond appropriately if the threat grows, Putin implicitly warns of possible retaliatory actions, creating a sense of fear and deterrence. This fallacy involves using fear to influence perceptions rather than providing a detailed assessment of the situation.
• Appeal to Authority: Putin references Russia's ongoing state of combat readiness to lend credibility and authority to his dismissal of NATO's actions. This fallacy involves appealing to authority (in this case, Russia's military readiness) to strengthen the argument without addressing the specific implications of NATO's increased readiness.
• Red Herring: By emphasizing Russia's permanent combat readiness, Putin diverts attention from the specific issue of NATO's actions and their potential impact on global stability and security. This fallacy introduces an irrelevant point to divert attention from the core issue being discussed.
• Straw Man: Putin simplifies the concerns about NATO's actions by framing it as a non-issue due to Russia's own readiness, thereby avoiding a deeper discussion on the implications for global security This fallacy involves misrepresenting the complexity of the situation to make it easier to dismiss.

Alexander Yunashev: Alexander Yunashev, Life.

You have repeatedly stated that Zelensky is illegitimate, and that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is the only legitimate body. Has any of the deputies attempted to send a signal or enter into talks with you? Are we negotiating with anyone behind the scenes?

And, off the record, how much sleep have you been getting lately?

Putin: Do you mean deputies of the Verkhovna Rada?

I know nothing about this. You said that I have “repeatedly stated.” I did not say anything. I simply analysed the situation, or rather, our lawyers analysed the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine. I mentioned its articles, specifically, Article 83, which explicitly states that the presidential term should not exceed five years. Articles 109, 110 and 112 state that the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada shall assume powers, including those of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in the event of martial law. Everything is clearly stated there.

• Evasion: Putin avoids directly answering the question about whether deputies have reached out, focusing instead on the legal analysis of Zelensky's legitimacy. Evasion involves avoiding the direct question and shifting the focus to another topic.
• Appeal to Authority: Putin refers to the analysis by our lawyers to lend credibility to his statements about the Ukrainian Constitution. This fallacy involves appealing to authority to support an argument without addressing the core issue.
• Straw Man: By focusing on the constitutional analysis, Putin creates a straw man argument that simplifies the journalist's broader question about legitimacy and potential negotiations. This misrepresents the question to make it easier to address without engaging with the underlying concerns.

The martial law act also states that no presidential elections shall take place. But it does not say that the president’s powers shall be extended, and this means that his term has expired.

• Begging the Question: Putin assumes that the lack of a provision for extending presidential powers during martial law automatically means Zelensky's term has expired. This fallacy assumes the conclusion within the premise without providing sufficient evidence.

Finally, the Constitutional Court issued a decision in 2015 stating explicitly that the presidential term shall not exceed five years. So what are we talking about? The West simply does not want to replace him today because apparently, it is not the right time.

• Conspiracy theory: Putin suggests that the West is deliberately not replacing Zelensky for its own reasons, implying a conspiracy. This fallacy involves suggesting that events are the result of a secret plot by powerful individuals or organizations without sufficient evidence.

I have already said this, and I believe that it should be obvious to everyone. He will be blamed for all unpopular decisions, including the reduction in the draft age, and he will be replaced later on. I believe that this will happen somewhere in the first half of 2025.

• Speculation: Putin speculates about the future actions of the West and the timing of Zelensky's replacement without concrete evidence. This involves making a conjecture without sufficient evidence to support the claim.

Olga Samsonova: What do you think they are trying to achieve? What is their goal? Is this perhaps a provocation, daring you, trying to get a reaction?

Vladimir Putin: Indeed, that is what we see. As you said, they are always ratcheting up tensions and escalating the situation. Apparently, they expect us to back down at some point. But at the same time, they keep saying they want to defeat us on the battlefield by inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia. What would this mean for Russia? For Russia, it would mean the loss of its statehood. It would be the end of the thousand-year history of the Russian state. I think this should be clear to everyone. And so, the question arises: why should we be afraid? Wouldn’t it make more sense to stand firm until the end? This is formal logic 101 – I think we only had one semester of formal logic at the university, but I remember it well. I even remember the professor who taught that course.

I think those who think this, and especially those who say this, are making another big mistake.

• Straw Man Fallacy:  Putin constructs a simplified version of the West's intentions, suggesting that their sole aim is to defeat Russia on the battlefield and cause the loss of its statehood. This misrepresents the complexity of international relations and the multitude of factors at play in the West's stance toward Russia.
• Argumentum in Terrorem: Putin evokes fear by suggesting that the West's actions could lead to the end of Russia's thousand-year statehood. This fallacy aims to create fear to justify a strong, defensive stance without addressing the actual likelihood or complexity of such an outcome.
• False Dichotomy (Either/Or Fallacy): Putin frames the situation as one where Russia must either stand firm or face the complete loss of statehood. This presents a false binary choice, ignoring other possible outcomes or strategies that could be employed in response to the West's actions.
• Appeal to Tradition: By mentioning the thousand-year history of the Russian state, Putin appeals to the long-standing tradition and continuity of the Russian state. This suggests that because something has been around for a long time, it must be preserved at all costs, without considering the current context or potential for evolution.
• Appeal to Authority: Putin references his university education and a course in formal logic to lend credibility to his argument. This attempts to bolster his stance by invoking his personal educational background rather than addressing the core issues of the current geopolitical situation.

Vladimir Putin: Let’s take a couple more questions.

Go ahead, please.

Vera Desyatova: According to reports from the special military operation theatre, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are preparing a new counteroffensive attempt in the Kharkov area. Is there any confirmed information, and are our troops ready to repel it?

Vladimir Putin: Our military is preparing for every possible scenario.

As for the Kharkov theatre, I have already said this, it is no secret. Six months ago, I made it clear that if they continued to target Russian communities in the border region, we would have to create a security area, a sanitary zone, on Ukrainian territory. They continued the shelling, and we did what we said we would.

• Appeal to Tradition: Putin references his previous statements and actions to show consistency in his approach. This aims to build trust and credibility by demonstrating follow-through on threats. This can be seen as implying that past actions justify current or future actions.

Yes, we know that the Americans and Europeans are mainly behind this. They are pushing the Ukrainians to drive our units to the state border at any cost – again, I want to emphasise this, to do whatever it takes – and they plan to present this as a major success in 2024 ahead of the planned NATO summit and later the elections in the United States.

• Scapegoating (Blame Shifting): Putin shifts blame to Western countries for the conflict escalation. This strategy diverts responsibility and frames the conflict as driven by external actors. This represents a form of scapegoating, potentially oversimplifying the roles and motivations of different parties involved.

We will see what actually happens. But this whatever it takes part – I assure you that this is how it is, I know what I am talking about – of course, if it is not based on reality, it will again take a toll on the Ukrainian armed forces. We will see.

• Appeal to Personal Credibility or Appeal to authority: Putin emphasizes his knowledge and authority on the situation. He aims to instill confidence in his insights and predictions. This can be an Appeal to Authority, where his personal assurance is used to bolster his argument without additional evidence.

In any case, as we understand – I did say that we had no intention to advance to Kharkov and so on, but it is still a tactical theatre, and the enemy will try to present it as a strategic success – if they succeed. Let’s see what they will actually do. But this has already entailed heavy losses. I think that, most likely, the situation will develop in the same vein.

• False Dichotomy (Either/Or Fallacy): Putin suggests that the situation in Kharkov will either remain the same or result in heavy losses for Ukraine. This presents limited outcomes, simplifying the complexity of military operations. This is a False Dichotomy, presenting two possible scenarios while ignoring other potential developments.

It is very difficult to make any forecasts, because it is hostilities we are talking about, a highly volatile situation – people are being shot at, sustaining losses, you see? Therefore, it is difficult to say anything now, but my assessment is as I said.

Yes, please.

Gleb Ivanov: Yesterday, after talks with the DPRK leader, you said that the UN Security Council sanctions against the DPRK should be revised.

Vladimir Putin: I have just repeated this.

Georgy Ivanov: Yes, you have. The question is: how can this be done, given that the main initiator of these sanctions is strongly against this? Can a reform of the UN Security Council be an option, as some of our BRICS friends have suggested? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin: Speaking about the reform of the UN and its Security Council, this problem goes far beyond the issues you have raised here.

• Evasion: Putin begins by addressing the broader context of UN reform rather than directly answering the question about revising sanctions against the DPRK. This allows him to steer the conversation toward a broader issue, deflecting from the immediate question. This can be seen as an evasion, redirecting the focus to a related but broader topic.

The Security Council is the key body of the UN established after the Second World War based on its results. Of course, the global situation is changing, which calls for reforming that international institution as well. But this reform must be based on a broad consensus, as our Foreign Ministry has recently started saying. If the reform is based on a behind-the-scenes decision taken by a group of countries or one country, it will not benefit the international community, which will lose access to this mechanism of settling disputes. However hard this may be and however large the side effects, the Security Council is functioning, one way or another. This is why we stand for its reform but only on the basis of a broad consensus, as I have said.

• Appeal to Tradition: Putin references the historical context of the UN Security Council's establishment post-World War II to emphasize its legitimacy. He seeks to underscore the importance of maintaining established international mechanisms. This fallacy involves suggesting that because something has a historical precedent, it must continue unchanged.
• Appeal to Consensus: He insists that any reform must be based on a broad consensus. He tryes to emphasize the need for collective agreement, by positioning Russia as a supporter of multilateralism. This can also be an appeal to consensus, implying that widespread agreement is necessary without addressing the practical difficulties in achieving such consensus.

As for revising sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, I have expressed my view. I understand that this will be next to impossible to do by ordinary means in the current situation, yet we must keep working on it. We must also show that certain instruments, like in the case of labour migration, which were proposed and coordinated under US guidance some time ago, of course, are losing the effect, the essence and the humanitarian purpose for the sake of which they were introduced in the first place. Therefore, we intend to launch and carry on this work. As we say, little strokes fell great oaks. We will see what comes of it.

• Appeal to Persistence (Little Strokes Fell Great Oaks): Putin uses the idiom to suggest that continuous effort will eventually lead to success in revising the sanctions. This aims to inspire patience and perseverance, indicating that change is possible through persistent efforts. While not a strict logical fallacy, it simplifies the complexity of international sanctions and their revision.
• Begging the Question: He argues that certain sanctions, like those on labor migration, have lost their humanitarian purpose. This attempts to frame the sanctions as outdated and ineffective, appealing to the need for their revision, assuming that the sanctions are inherently flawed without fully substantiating why they no longer serve their intended purpose.

In responding to Gleb Ivanov's question, Putin uses various rhetorical strategies and logical fallacies to address the complex issue of revising UN Security Council sanctions against the DPRK. By evading direct answers, appealing to tradition and consensus, and critiquing the effectiveness of current sanctions, he frames the need for persistent effort and multilateral agreement while avoiding detailed discussions on the practicalities of achieving such reforms. This approach aims to position Russia as a proponent of measured and collective international action while subtly criticizing existing mechanisms and suggesting the potential for gradual change.

Putin: Let us have the last question, and this will be all.

Alexei Konopko: After your talks in the DPRK yesterday, the American media wrote that the US intelligence services were shocked by the speed of Moscow’s rapprochement with Pyongyang, Beijing, and Tehran. Comrade Kim Jong-un also noted that the treaty was signed only several months after the idea was aired. Can you explain this speed? Has Russia become a more attractive partner, or have third countries revised their attitude to international realities and diplomacy?

Vladimir Putin: I have no answer. It is difficult to comment on this because I do not know what the US intelligence community thinks about the current developments. It is one of the best intelligence services in the world. I think that they have all the necessary information, and we can hardly expect such a reaction from them, especially since we are openly speaking about this [rapprochement]. You do not need to work with electronic intelligence or agents on the ground to see where we are headed and how far we have progressed. We did this openly, and all the relevant elements were openly discussed.

1. Evasion: Putin starts by deflecting the question, claiming ignorance of the US intelligence community's thoughts. He avoided directly addressing the core question about the rapid rapprochement. This is a form of evasion, avoiding a direct answer to the reporter's query.
2. Appeal to Authority: Putin praises the US intelligence services as one of the best in the world. He seeks to lend credibility to his argument by acknowledging the competence of the opposing side. This can be seen as an appeal to authority, suggesting that because the US intelligence is highly competent, their reaction should be expected.

Of course, some articles were discussed behind closed doors, but overall, they could read the treaty we signed in the 1960s, which we have reproduced almost in full. So, it is strange that this should cause surprise or that the US intelligence community was not prepared for this.

• Appeal to Tradition: Putin references the treaty signed in the 1960s, suggesting that the current treaty is a continuation of this historical agreement. This fallacy involves suggesting that because something has been done in the past, it is justified or correct in the present context.
• Straw Man: Putin suggests that the US intelligence community's surprise is unwarranted because the treaty is based on a historical agreement. This misrepresents the potential reasons for the surprise, simplifying the complexity of the geopolitical situation. This misrepresents the US intelligence community's possible concerns, making it easier to refute their surprise.

We certainly acted energetically, but in the obtaining global situation we need to strengthen the legal framework of relations with our partners, especially in the spheres we regard as important, including in light of the developments in Asia. We do see what is going on in Asia, don’t we? A bloc system is being created there. NATO is moving to Asia for permanent residence. This is definitely posing a threat to all regional countries, including the Russian Federation. We must respond and we will respond to that.

• Argumentum in Terrorem: Putin evokes fear by highlighting the perceived threat of NATO's presence in Asia. He aims to justify Russia's actions as necessary defensive measures against external threats. This fallacy aims to create fear to justify a strong response without addressing the actual threat level or the complexity of the situation.
• False Dichotomy (Either/Or Fallacy): Putin frames the situation as one where Russia must either act energetically or face significant threats from NATO's expansion into Asia. This presents a false binary choice, ignoring other possible diplomatic or strategic responses. This presents a limited view of the options available, suggesting that immediate and strong action is the only viable response.
• Oversimplification: Putin simplifies the geopolitical dynamics by attributing Russia's actions solely to NATO's movements in Asia. He reduces the complexity of international relations to a single factor, making it easier to justify Russia's stance. This fallacy involves oversimplifying a complex situation, ignoring other factors that might influence Russia's actions.

Putin: Thank you very much, all the best, and good-bye.

At the end of reading:

Throughout the session, Putin employs various rhetorical techniques and logical fallacies to frame his narrative, justify Russia's actions, and deflect criticism.

Key Observations:

• Deflection and Evasion: Putin frequently deflects direct questions or evades detailed answers. For instance, when asked about specific motivations behind the treaty with North Korea or potential negotiations with Ukrainian deputies, he shifts focus or provides ambiguous responses. This tactic serves to avoid addressing the core issues directly.
• Appeal to Historical Continuity: Putin often references historical agreements and past practices to justify current actions. By appealing to tradition, he implies that longstanding practices validate current policies, despite changing geopolitical contexts.
• Straw Man and False Dichotomies: In several responses, Putin misrepresents opposing viewpoints or simplifies complex situations into binary choices. This allows him to more easily dismiss criticism and portray Russia's actions as rational and justified.
• Emotional Appeals and Analogies: Putin uses emotional appeals and historical analogies to garner sympathy and support. By drawing parallels between current sanctions on North Korea and historical tragedies like the siege of Leningrad, he aims to evoke an emotional response that deflects from the rationale behind the sanctions.
• Strategic Ambiguity: By leaving room for flexible interpretation of treaties and agreements, Putin maintains a position that can be adjusted later as needed. This equivocation allows him to come back with different approaches while claiming consistency.

Sincerity and Hidden Agenda:

Putin's level of sincerity can be questioned given his consistent use of rhetorical strategies to obscure direct answers and avoid accountability. His responses suggest a calculated approach to maintain Russia's strategic interests while deflecting international criticism and scrutiny.

The hidden agenda appears to be multifaceted:

• Maintaining Strategic Alliances: The emphasis on historical treaties and alliances suggests a focus on preserving and strengthening Russia's geopolitical partnerships, especially with countries like North Korea.
• Deflecting Criticism: By framing narratives that highlight Western hypocrisy or aggression, Putin aims to divert criticism away from Russia's actions in Ukraine and other regions.
• Projecting Strength and Stability: Through appeals to historical continuity and preparedness, Putin seeks to project an image of Russia as a stable and resilient power, capable of weathering international pressures.

Conclusion:

Overall, Putin's responses in this press conference reveal a sophisticated use of rhetoric aimed at justifying Russia's actions, deflecting criticism, and maintaining strategic ambiguity. While these techniques serve his immediate objectives, they also highlight a lack of transparency and a propensity for manipulating narratives to suit Russia's geopolitical agenda. This approach, while effective in the short term, may contribute to increasing skepticism and distrust among international observers and counterparts.

The analyze of reporters' questions during the press conference reveals a mix of genuine concerns and strategically framed inquiries designed to allow President Putin to convey his messages. Here are some observations on the nature of the questions:

Genuine Concerns:

• Strategic and Security Implications:
  • Questions about the implications of the treaty with North Korea and potential involvement in Ukraine reflect genuine concerns about regional stability and security. For example, Pavel Minakov's question about the application of the treaty's mutual assistance clause in the context of Ukraine indicates a real interest in understanding the potential military commitments.
  • Similarly, inquiries into the potential use of nuclear weapons and changes in nuclear doctrine by Yekaterina Lazareva show a concern for global security and the conditions under which Russia might alter its strategic policies.
• Economic and Sanction Impacts:
  • Questions from Anastasia Savinykh about economic outlook and LNG projects with Vietnam demonstrate genuine interest in the economic ramifications of Russia's international relations and the pressures exerted by U.S. policies.

Servile Approach:

• Framing Opportunities for Putin:
  • Some questions appear crafted to provide Putin with platforms to present his narrative. For instance, Konstantin Panyushkin's question about collective security and the DPRK treaty seemed to be a setup for Putin to reiterate the defensive nature of the treaty, thereby justifying the alliance without appearing aggressive.
  • Similarly, Konstantin Kokoveshnikov's question on the rejection of Putin’s peace proposals in Ukraine allowed Putin to present himself as a rational actor willing to negotiate, thus painting the Western rejection in a negative light.
• Softball Questions:
  • Certain questions, like Viktor Syneok’s follow-up about the reception in the DPRK and the nature of his relationship with Kim Jong-un, provided Putin with the opportunity to portray positive diplomatic relations and personal rapport without delving into more contentious or critical issues.
  • Viktor Syneok's question about the legitimacy of Ukrainian leadership and potential negotiations does its framing and underlying assumptions. It gives Putin a platform to assert his narrative about Ukrainian illegitimacy and Western complicity without facing a challenging or probing follow-up. This categorization highlights the dual nature of the press conference, where some reporters sought genuine insights while others facilitated the propagation of the official Russian stance.

There is not a significant shift in the stance of Russian reporters from being servile to genuinely concerned about Russia's future fate. The press conference still largely reflects a controlled media environment where the majority of questions serve to support and propagate the official state narrative. However, the presence of a few more probing questions suggests that there may be slight openings for more genuine inquiry within the constraints of state-controlled media. This nuanced shift could indicate a growing undercurrent of concern among some reporters, but it is not yet indicative of a broad transformation in the overall media stance.

• Fallacies in Propaganda