This revelation, detailed in a 2024 report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) source, is just one instance of a broader campaign of foreign influence operations infiltrating Canada’s political system.

The report sheds light on how China, India, and other foreign actors have been covertly manipulating Canadian elections, media, and policymakers.

These tactics, while alarming in Canada, are not unique.

From the United States to Australia to Europe, democracies worldwide are under siege by foreign governments seeking to control political narratives and policies.

The Tactics: How Foreign Powers Undermine Democracies

Foreign interference is not a new phenomenon, but modern technology and globalization have supercharged the ability of authoritarian states to manipulate democratic processes from within.

Covert Influence on Voters and Politicians

In a classified intelligence briefing, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officials described how China’s United Front Work Department actively targets ethnocultural communities in Canada.

One method involves embedding operatives within community organizations, presenting themselves as leaders advocating for cultural pride while subtly steering opinions in favor of Beijing.

A 2021 report from CSIS indicated that pro-Beijing organizations in Canada were instructed to campaign against certain politicians, particularly those critical of the Chinese government.

The United Front strategy also monitors and pressures individuals who oppose China’s policies, often leveraging economic connections or threats to family members overseas.

  • Disinformation and censorship: WeChat, a popular Chinese messaging app, has been flooded with posts that spread anti-Conservative narratives ahead of elections, discouraging Chinese-Canadian voters from supporting the party. A 2021 CSIS report noted that many of these posts had direct links to Beijing-controlled entities.
  • Intimidation tactics: MP Michael Chong was just one of several lawmakers targeted. Intelligence reports revealed Chinese officials discussed ways to pressure Canadian politicians seen as hostile to their interests. “They want to make an example of me,” Chong later said in an interview.

Buying Influence in Political Systems

Foreign governments don’t just manipulate from afar—they embed their influence into the system itself:

  • Secret campaign funding: NSICOP uncovered evidence of foreign money funneled into political campaigns through “business donations” linked to foreign state-owned enterprises.
  • Clandestine networks: India has built a network of proxies within Canadian political circles, including business leaders and political aides who push pro-India policies in Parliament, often unknowingly aiding a foreign agenda. Intelligence assessments from CSIS found that some Indian-origin political donors were receiving direct instructions from Indian officials.

Exploiting Cyber and Media Tools

  • Election interference through hacking: In 2019, a hacking attempt linked to foreign state actors targeted Canada’s electoral infrastructure—though unsuccessful, it showed a willingness to breach digital defenses.
  • Amplifying false narratives: Russia, a global expert in disinformation warfare, has been less active in Canada but has targeted European and American elections with bot-driven propaganda campaigns.

The Government’s Response: Where It Falls Short

Despite growing awareness, Canada’s response has been fragmented.

While intelligence agencies have flagged foreign interference, a lack of coordination among governmental bodies has hampered action.

A key weakness is the absence of a foreign agent registry, a tool that other countries like Australia and the U.S. use to track individuals lobbying on behalf of foreign governments.

The NSICOP report also found that while Canada’s intelligence agencies frequently identified foreign interference, the information was not always shared effectively with decision-makers.

In some cases, elected officials remained unaware of the threats they were facing until after media leaks forced disclosures.

What Needs to Happen: How Democracies Can Fight Back

To combat foreign interference effectively, Canada and other democracies must implement a series of strategic reforms:

  1. Establish a foreign agent registry: Countries such as the U.S. and Australia have laws requiring individuals lobbying on behalf of foreign governments to register publicly. Implementing this in Canada would improve transparency and accountability.
  2. Increase cybersecurity protections: Strengthening digital defenses against election-related hacking attempts is crucial. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has identified foreign hacking attempts targeting critical election infrastructure, and investments in cybersecurity must be prioritized.
  3. Enhance intelligence-sharing mechanisms: Ensuring that lawmakers and government officials are fully informed about foreign interference threats in real-time will allow for quicker responses.
  4. Hold perpetrators accountable through sanctions: The NSICOP report suggests that targeted economic and diplomatic sanctions against nations engaging in interference could deter future actions.
  5. Public awareness campaigns: Educating citizens about disinformation tactics and foreign influence efforts will help voters recognize and resist manipulation.

Conclusion: The Stakes for Democracy

Without decisive action, foreign interference will continue to undermine democratic institutions worldwide.

Canada’s experience serves as a stark warning: vigilance, transparency, and legislative action are necessary to protect free and fair elections.

If left unchecked, these tactics will not only weaken Canada’s political system but set a dangerous precedent for other democracies.

“Foreign interference is no longer a distant threat—it is a reality. The time to act is now.” – National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, 2024 Report

Sources

 Report overview

Detailed Summary: Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions

Overview: The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) submitted this report to the Prime Minister on March 22, 2024, with a revised version released in June 2024.

The document assesses the state of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic institutions, detailing key threat actors, tactics, and the Canadian government’s response.

The report draws on classified intelligence and highlights systemic vulnerabilities that allow foreign actors to covertly manipulate Canadian political processes.

Key Findings:

1. Threat Actors

The report identifies several foreign states engaged in interference, with China (PRC) and India being the most active.

  • China (PRC) remains the most significant foreign interference threat, utilizing sophisticated influence operations targeting all levels of Canadian government and civil society.
  • India has emerged as the second-most significant actor, expanding its influence beyond countering pro-Khalistan activism to broader political interference.
  • Pakistan, Iran, and other states have engaged in activities affecting specific communities but were not identified as major threats to democratic institutions.
  • Russia, despite its past influence operations, did not prioritize Canadian democratic processes during the review period.

2. Tactics Used by Foreign Actors

Foreign interference occurs through a mix of covert and overt activities, targeting politicians, voters, media, and community organizations.

  • Covert Influence of Voters and Communities:
    • PRC officials have manipulated ethnocultural communities, particularly Chinese-Canadian groups, to influence voting patterns and suppress criticism of Beijing.
    • India has used media influence and community engagement to promote pro-India narratives.
  • Manipulation of Political Candidates and Officials:
    • Intelligence reports highlight cases of elected officials unknowingly or wittingly assisting foreign states.
    • Some candidates received undisclosed financial support from foreign governments.
    • PRC officials categorized Canadian politicians into “pro-China” and “anti-China” groups, rewarding allies and targeting critics with coercion or disinformation campaigns.
  • Use of Cyber Tools and Disinformation:
    • PRC-directed social media campaigns sought to discredit politicians and influence public opinion, particularly during elections.
    • India has leveraged intelligence networks to produce materials aimed at undermining Canadian political figures.
    • WeChat and other censored platforms were used to spread state-approved messaging while blocking dissenting views.
  • Foreign-Run Community Organizations and Proxies:
    • PRC-controlled organizations have covertly funded and mobilized support for preferred candidates.
    • Indian intelligence networks have developed extensive contacts within Canadian political circles to influence policy decisions.
  • Threats and Coercion Against Politicians:
    • PRC officials collected intelligence on Canadian MPs, particularly those of Chinese descent, to exert influence or apply pressure.
    • Conservative MP Michael Chong was targeted by a PRC-directed online disinformation campaign after sponsoring a motion condemning China’s treatment of Uyghurs.
    • Reports suggest foreign actors possess compromising material on Canadian politicians for potential leverage.

3. Government Response and Challenges

The report assesses Canada’s response as inconsistent and hindered by systemic issues:

  • Lack of Coordination and Information Sharing: Intelligence reports on foreign interference were not always disseminated effectively among government officials.
  • Gaps in Policy and Legal Frameworks: Canada lacks a foreign agent registry, limiting enforcement actions against those acting on behalf of foreign states.
  • Weak Enforcement Against Interference: Despite RCMP investigations, no charges have been laid against foreign interference actors.
  • Public Awareness Deficits: Many targeted communities and politicians remain unaware of the extent of foreign influence operations.
  • Limited Government Response to Online Disinformation: The attribution problem makes it difficult to counteract coordinated campaigns effectively.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The report concludes that Canada remains a permissive environment for foreign interference, with insufficient tools to counteract sophisticated influence operations. Key recommendations include:

  • Stronger legal measures, including a foreign agent registry and updated intelligence-sharing protocols.
  • Increased transparency, ensuring political candidates and the public are informed about foreign threats.
  • Better enforcement mechanisms, empowering law enforcement to act against covert influence operations.
  • Improved cybersecurity efforts to detect and mitigate foreign-run disinformation campaigns.