The Forged Letter (2019): The Trigger
In November 2019, a letter began circulating on U.S.-based websites and social platforms.
It appeared official — printed on Greenlandic government letterhead, complete with a case file number, and signed by Ane Lone Bagger, then Greenland’s Foreign Minister.
Addressed to U.S. Senator Tom Cotton, the letter:
- Expressed gratitude for American “financial assistance”
- Declared Greenland’s readiness to hold a referendum on independence from Denmark
- Proposed a future status as an “organized non-aligned territory”
- Requested an additional 30% increase in funding
None of it was real.
The letter was a forgery, confirmed by the Government of Greenland and later assessed by Danish intelligence (PET) as the product of Russian operatives. Its appearance just days after a U.S. delegation visited Nuuk — and its rapid spread across platforms like Reddit and Indybay — suggested deliberate targeting of U.S. political influencers.
The bait worked. Senator Cotton reportedly took the letter seriously and raised the Greenland issue with the Trump White House. Within days, President Trump floated the idea of purchasing Greenland publicly — prompting immediate rejection from Denmark and deepening tensions between Copenhagen and Washington.
In this moment, Russia’s goal was not to deceive the public — it was to provoke a real-world diplomatic rupture. And it succeeded.
Attribution and Tradecraft
By 2024, multiple sources — including the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) and Denmark’s Security and Intelligence Service (PET) — had publicly confirmed what specialists in cognitive warfare had long suspected: the forged Greenland letter was a Russian disinformation operation.
The operation followed a recognizable pattern drawn from Soviet-era active measures, updated for the digital age:
- Forgery as a narrative weapon: The letter was forged to mirror real diplomatic language and formatting, calibrated to seem just plausible enough to pass.
- Targeted narrative injection: Rather than deceive the public, it was aimed at elite policymakers — in this case, a reliably hawkish U.S. senator.
- Information laundering: The document surfaced on fringe websites like Indybay, designed to appear as organic grassroots content rather than a foreign op.
- Linguistic telltales: Awkward English constructions — such as “regarding to that” and “additional trench” (likely meant tranche) — were consistent with known Russian forgeries.
But most importantly, the operation reflected a core doctrine of Russian psychological warfare: reflexive control. The aim was not to coerce.
It was to create the illusion of autonomy — to feed just enough false information that the adversary would make the desired decision on their own.
Trump’s Strategic Alignment with Russian Objectives
While there is "no conclusive evidence" that Donald Trump has ever coordinated directly with Russian intelligence, his "political instincts" — especially regarding NATO, the Arctic, and Western unity — have consistently aligned with Russian strategic goals.
The Greenland episode is one of the clearest illustrations of this convergence.
In response to the forged letter, Trump’s 2019 proposal to buy Greenland seemed impulsive, even absurd. But the Kremlin could not have asked for a better outcome. The fallout was immediate:
- Denmark called the idea “absurd” and rebuffed the overture
- Trump canceled a planned state visit to Copenhagen
- Greenlandic officials expressed outrage, deepening tensions within the Kingdom of Denmark
What appeared domestically as a diplomatic misstep functioned externally as a strategic wedge — driving division between two NATO members and casting the U.S. in a neo-colonial light.
And this was not an isolated case. Throughout his presidency, Trump:
- Repeatedly questioned NATO’s relevance
- Praised authoritarian leaders while antagonizing democratic allies
- Withdrew from multilateral agreements favored by Western partners
- Undermined U.S. presence in regions where Russia sought to expand influence
In Arctic policy, as in European security, Trump’s "instincts" often advanced Russian interests — not "necessarily" due to collusion, but because his "worldview" is unusually vulnerable to influence.
Biden’s Disruption: Strategic Reversal (2021–2024)
The 2020 election of Joe Biden marked a sharp strategic reversal in U.S. foreign policy — particularly in the Arctic. Where Trump’s posturing had fractured alliances, Biden’s administration sought to restore transatlantic trust and reassert strategic unity.
In the Nordic-Baltic region, this meant:
- Reaffirming U.S. commitment to Article 5 and joint NATO exercises
- Increasing diplomatic and environmental cooperation with Greenland and Denmark
- Supporting multilateral Arctic policy
- Explicitly rejecting any narrative of U.S. territorial acquisition
Under Biden, Greenland was no longer treated as a geopolitical pawn — it was respected as a strategic partner.
From Moscow’s perspective, this was a setback. The fracture it had attempted to widen was healing. U.S. actions were reinforcing NATO unity in the Arctic, not undermining it.
For a time, the reflexive control operation seeded in 2019 appeared defused. But only temporarily.
2025 — The Greenland Narrative Returns
In early 2025, the narrative reemerged. At a press conference in Greenland, Vice President JD Vance declared that the United States “should own Greenland” — echoing, nearly word for word, Donald Trump’s 2019 proposal.
This time, the message came not as an offhand remark, but as a policy signal from the highest levels of U.S. leadership.
The statement came within days of Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirming the Arctic as a strategic frontier and pledging new investments in polar military expansion.
Within the same news cycle, Greenland again found itself the object of great power competition — and psychological manipulation.
With Trump now back in office and Vance installed as Vice President, a familiar Arctic narrative is once again being advanced — but this time with executive power behind it.
This was not coincidence. It was a resumption of the reflexive control arc seeded in 2019. The forged letter had long since vanished from headlines, but its narrative structure remained:
- Frame Greenland as leaning toward U.S. alignment
- Stoke Danish insecurity and Greenlandic resentment
- Trigger real political reactions among NATO actors
- Reinforce the perception of Western discord in the Arctic
This is the power of reflexive control. No force is required. The targets destabilize themselves — so long as they follow the script.
Greenland as a Cognitive Battlefield
The 2019 forged letter wasn’t just a hoax. It was a weaponized narrative, embedded within a geopolitical influence strategy that continues to evolve.
Russia’s use of reflexive control — manipulating adversaries into acting in ways that serve Moscow’s interests — is not theoretical.
The Greenland episode was its operational debut in the Arctic. And Trump, wittingly or not, played the role required.
Biden’s presidency temporarily disrupted that trajectory. But the narrative has now returned, repackaged for the 2025 cycle, and once again aligned with Russian goals.
Greenland is not just a landmass of ice and minerals. It is a cognitive terrain — a symbolic and strategic prize in a contest of narratives, sovereignty, and influence.
And once again, the United States is playing into the hands of the adversary that planted the trap to begin with.
Footnotes
- NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Russia’s Information Influence Operations in the Nordic-Baltic Region, November 2024, PDF
- High North News, “Fake Ministerial Letter from Greenland Adds Fuel to Hybrid Attack Rumors,” Nov 12, 2019, Link
- Daily Kos, “Trump’s Greenland Noise Started with a Fake Letter Sent by Russians,” Jan 20, 2025, Link
- Latin Times, “Russia Allegedly Pretended to Be Denmark in Hoax Letter to U.S. Senator,” Jan 14, 2025, Link
- Euromaidan Press, “Danish Intelligence: Russia Forged Letter to Spark Trump’s Greenland Purchase Bid,” Jan 13, 2025, Link
- U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns — Volume 5, Aug 2020, PDF
