Figure 1. Withdrawal of the Soviet Army. From the Photo Collection of the Latvian War Museum. See Andis Kudors, The withdrawal of the Russian Army 30 years ago at LSM, Guntars Laganowski, Bitter Victory: Russian troops for export – 30 at lvportals.lv, and the report by Tālavs Jundzis’ for detailed Summaries, in Latvian. This contribution focuses on the Red Army Withdrawal *Data*.

Churn, Diversion, Criminality and Disappearance into the Baltic Societies.

How did the Kremlin use the Red Army Withdrawal to implement more Aggressions against the three, newly sovereign, Baltic countries? Now we have the datasets from 1992-1994, 121 Troop Watch columns of The Baltic Independent. These are valuable data for European OSINT practitioners, journalists, Think Tanks, intelligence agencies and defense ministries who want to assess the Kremlin’s likely actions when their Russian armies are situated in place, in legal greyzones, after the Kremlin’s long occupations.

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The Soviet Occupying Forces in the Baltic Countries at Re-Independence

May 4, 1990, the day of Latvia’s vote for Restoration of Independence, is a day burned in the memories of one-and-half million Latvians, many of whom remember this vote (Latvijas Televīzija video). In that vote-count scene, in the center of old town Riga, we see the unmistakable emotion in civil society (historical photos at LSM), a day which began a transition away from 50 years of USSR Occupation.

 What we don’t see in that video and these historical photos, were the scale of the Occupying Soviet forces, who mostly remained in place, nearby in their garrisons, assessing. On this historic day, Soviet-occupied Riga functioned as a major military command, logistics, and internal security hub for the Soviet forces in the Baltic region, one of the most strategically important Soviet command centers outside of Moscow. The Soviet forces were observing the Latvians in Riga, who, on May 4, 1990 were only ~37% in demographics (Gatis Krūmiņš’ latest paper) in their own capital city, after the USSR 50-year genocide on the Latvian nation. In the rest of the Latvian territories, the Latvians were on average only ~52% in demographics in their own country.

Figure 2. Deputies of the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR after the adoption of the declaration "On the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Latvia" at the Supreme Council building. May 4, 1990. Photographer Ints Kalnins. LNVM collection.

Figure 3. People at the building of the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR during the adoption of the declaration “On the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia”. May 4, 1990. Photographer Gunārs Birkmanis. LNVM collection.

Nearby to the May 4, 1990, vote taking place in old Riga, was the:

• USSR Baltic Military District Headquarters, which was the Regional command for Soviet forces in the Baltic republics, which performed planning, communications, and intelligence coordination,
• Riga Higher Military-Political School (RVVPKU), which trained political officers for the Soviet armed forces, including ideological and command education,
• The USSR Baltic MVD (Министерство внутренних дел or Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs) Base of Interior Troops and Riga OMON, for paramilitary forces and special-purpose detachments, which could operate across the Baltic republics and, if required, and elsewhere in the USSR,
• The USSR KGB Headquarters (Latvian SSR), with thousands of KGB agents in Riga,
• The USSR Communications and Signals Facilities for military communications and encrypted transmission, and coordination between district HQs, Moscow, and field units,
• Logistics depots, highly concentrated ammunition depots, and transport infrastructure nodes,
• and Military-use air and radar infrastructure (Riga region).

These Riga bases and facilities enabled Soviet authorities to: command Baltic regional forces, monitor political activity and dissent, enforce internal security directives, control communications and logistics networks, and reinforce military presence if ordered. Combined with USSR military units elsewhere in USSR-occupied Latvia, the Latvian territory had ~3000+ military units in 700+ locations, 1640 km^2 of military bases, and was arguably the most densely militarised territory in the world at that time. (Source: LSM Keys Documentary).

Numbers of Red Army in the Baltics?

The Kremlin’s useful chaos includes no firm numbers for the number of USSR army at the end of the Cold War. The number of USSR Red Army military personnel in Latvia was ~60,000 (source: Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian), or more fuzzily: “50,000 to as many as 100,000 military personnel” (source: Guntars Laganowski in Latvian). These might only partially include family members, as the typical multiplier was x3 for family. At this time, in Estonia, more than 40,000 Soviet military personnel and their family members were stationed in Estonia in 570 military facilities (source: ERR), and in Lithuania ~50,000 Soviet military personnel were stationed (source: Sławomir Piotrowski). Of the latter, it might partially include family members. Together, the number of military in the Baltics, which might partially include family is ~150,000 Soviet military.

On February 22, 1993, members of the “Reform in the Army” group of deputies of the Russian parliament who were visiting army units in Latvia, stated that ~200,000 Russian troops were still stationed in the Baltics (source: top report in the 26-Feb_04_Mar_1993 Troop Watch column of The Baltic Independent). Since the figure didn’t state if it included family members, let’s dig deeper.

On May 31, 1993, an American memo from Bill Clinton, stated that “Remaining Troop Levels were: Estonia 5,900-9,000, Latvia 20,000-23,000, Lithuania 12,500-17,000”, where he noted that “Troop levels have, therefore decreased by 60-70 percent over the course of the past year.” These numbers were likely without family members. Some Math: if 30% remained, then the number of troops one year prior was 130,000 Russian troops. With Family that might be >250,000 (x3 = 390,000).

More Math: The 1989 population of the Baltic people including the population demographics after the 50-year Soviet genocide was 0.98M (EE) + 1.4M (LV) + 3.0 (LT) = 5.5M. The number of USSR army conservatively with their families: 0.25M, gives a ratio of one Soviet Soldier-Family for every 22^nd Baltic person. The ratio is the worst in Latvia, where out of Latvia's 26 districts, the Soviet army was only absent in two (Source: LSM Keys Documentary). In Latvia the ratio was, conservatively, one Soviet Army-Family for every 14^th Latvian.

The Baltic Independent Digitization Project- Troop Watch columns

The years 1991-1995, as seen in the English weekly The Baltic Independent (TBI) newspaper were critical years, in which the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania implemented renewed democratic processes for their sovereign countries. I have about ¾ of these weekly paper newsletters in hand, where my family and I are about halfway through the TBI newspaper digitization project (FundRazr).

Russia, which consolidated legal rights from the USSR, from early 1992 could no longer escape its obligations to remove its 50-year, occupying military forces, after its own international recognition of the three Baltic countries as newly re-Independent sovereign nations. The topic of the withdrawal of the Soviet occupying forces was the main theme in every TBI newspaper since August 1991, until the Soviet-Russian military was (mostly) removed by the Fall of 1994. However, it was far from a clean Red Army removal.

Starting in the 24-30 April, 1992 issue, (see the TBI Full-page), until the issue of the 16-24 September 1994 newspaper, the TBI editors began tracking the ex-Soviet military in a condensed column called “The Troop Watch”.

Since the Troop Watch column additionally summarized larger Red-Army withdrawal events that were elsewhere covered in detail in the newspaper, the Troop Watch columns are a valuable dataset about Soviet-Russian deception. With today’s analysis tools, these data can help people understand how the Kremlin uses chaos to implement more aggression upon people in territories where their occupying forces are in ‘flux’, pending and during troop withdrawal. With these new data, you too can see the Kremlin’s ‘useful chaos’ patterns.

Altogether, I have 121 Troop Watch Columns for you, of which each column has individual reports. Each report can, in turn, contain several, or many, incidents. In sum, I have 1314 individual Troop Watch reports covering >1600 incidents, which I’ve Optical Character Recognition'd (OCR’d) in what I call raw, “Level-0” data. With our scanning process halfway through the digitization of the full newspapers, I’ve separated the following data-files this way due to the cadence of the scanning project. I believe this data is the first, most valuable, database from the TBI newspapers beyond the existing tiff scans. The first two files take inputs from the OCR’d scanner tiff files, while the files: 3-Troop_Watch, 4-Troop_Watch, 5-Troop_Watch take inputs from my phone snapshots which AI tools successfully OCR’d in an exact text for me. Both the tiff and the jpg bitmaps are at the FundRazr and my Google Drive folders.

• 1-Troop_Watch_April_1992-December_1992.txt
• 2-Troop_Watch_Dec24_92-Aug5_1993.txt
• 3-Troop_Watch_Aug6-Dec17_1993.txt
• 4-Troop_Watch_Jan7-May20_1994.txt
• 5-Troop_Watch_Jun3-Sep16_1994.txt

Figure 4. In the 24-30 April, 1992 of The Baltic Independent weekly newspaper, on page 3 shows the first Troop Watch column.

I also add an additional text file of five OCR’d TBI news articles that assessed the final Red Army withdrawal situation, from the perspective of the Baltic governments, where you can read what went wrong, and how many ‘Phantom Soldiers’ remained in the Baltic countries illegally. (Sources: Articles 1ab: Troop Problems, Clinton Praises Sep 9, 1994 | Article 2: Thousand Troops Oct 14, 1994 | Article 3: Opinon, Phantom Soldiers)

• Troop_Withdrawal_Followup_September_October_1994.txt

I’ve made a “first steps” analysis on this Troop Watch data. I’ll get to those findings in a minute. I believe it is a deep well of information which can provide intelligence, for months and years in the present and future. We in the Baltics have a lot of experience with the Kremlin criminals and would like to continue to educate Europe and the rest of the world. If you think this new data update from the TBI is valuable with my stories, please consider donating to the FundRazr.

Figure 5. Cartoon illustrating the situation facing the Baltic countries upon Re-Independence. From the May 8-14, 1992, The Baltic Independent, page 3.

Troop Watch Column Themes

Here are theme categories that are the most common in the Troop Watch data:

• Russia’s Airspace Violations
• Soviet-Russian Withdrawal and Troop Movement Churn (Personnel flows, in and out)
• Baltic Countries’ Border Security and Sovereignty Enforcement
• Russia’s Smuggling, Theft and Illegal Arms Activity, including Diversion to the Black Market
• Russia’s Illegal Equipment Removal and Thefts, including Diversion to the Black Market
• Soviet-Russian Individual Soldiers’ Violent, Disorderly and Intimidation Activities
• Russia’s Political Pressure and Strategic Signaling
• Russian-Baltic Base and Property Conflicts, including unauthorized Russian Live-fire Exercises and Russian Illicit Real Estate Activities
• Soviet-Russian Environmental and Hazardous Legacy Issues

Important Troop Watch Data Context

The following provides extra political context.

• Russia continued to bring in fresh Red Army conscripts to the Baltic countries from September 1991 – 1994. See report by Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian. The Troop Watch data provides confirmation.
• Karaganov’s “Strategy for Russia” was to keep Russians in place in the Baltics as levers for future influence operations (Source: see report by Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian)
• Some rumours were floating in Baltic societies that the Kremlin forced (some) USSR military intelligence officers to take an early retirement in the Baltic countries. (Sources: See The Baltic Independent, 26Jun-2Jul_1992, page 3 and the ‘Pocket Pensioners’ chapter in the Hybrid War Tracker Handbook (Google Drive).)
• The three Baltic countries did not have a unified political approach to Russia, including for the Red Army Withdrawal. Each Baltic country implemented its own policy in a separate strategy. Russia exploited the Baltic countries’ divisions. (Sources: see report by Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian, and the full TBI five years of news articles, digitized so far here) I think a detailed analysts of the Troop Watch data will find that Russia was bullying each Baltic country differently to gain country-specific concessions.
  • For example: the Lithuanian Referendum result for Red Army Withdrawal in June 1992 demanded, in addition to the Troop Withdrawal, a US $150B compensation from USSR-Russia for 50-year damage to Lithuania. (Source: See 19-25_Jun_1992.pdf, page 3b)
  • Lithuania did not pursue their 50-year occupation compensation demand. My personal view is it was due to Russia’s bullying during these months, which caused the Lithuanian government to drop their demand. For example, Russia made 1,321 violations in Lithuanian airspace in 6 months. (Source: See the Troop Watch in 09-15_Oct_1992.pdf, page 3a)
• Soviet-Russian troops were actively, illegally, engaged in the Baltic countries’ real estate markets. (Source: see report by Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian)
• Russia was actively, unilaterally, demarcating Estonia’s borders during the 1991-1994 Red Army withdrawal period. Sources: July 1-7, 1994 TBI | fullpage, and other TBI news articles. You can find more Estonian border demarcation news by searching on ‘demarcating’ and ‘demarcation’ in the TBI OCR’d pdfs already available up to August 1993 here.
• There were multiple offers and implementations by the USA, Sweden, Denmark, and Estonia to fund and build new housing in Russia to speed up the withdrawal from the Baltic countries of the Soviet troops and the Soviet military intelligence officers. (Sources: Troop Watch columns and in USA government reports, for example this report by former President Clinton.) It might be worth an investigation if the new housing tasks were completed and the money was spent appropriately.
• The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian demographics at the time of Re-Independence after 50 year Occupations-Genocides was the following.

• Decolonization of the 1M+ occupiers (settler Russians who came to the Baltic countries during the 50-year occupation after deportations and executions of the Baltic people) was not pursued by the governments of the Baltic countries, although it was discussed (for example, see this September 1993 TBI Opinion article).
• With 30+ years hindsight, a decolonization policy should have been implemented. For example, Latvia and Estonia were put in a position, starting in 1991 August, to implement their renewed democratic principles while having only 52% and 62% of their own populations, respectively. Every vote became a numbers game. Their renewed democracies began during a period when tens of thousands of the Red Army and their colleagues and families were also still in place in the Baltic countries, in Kremlin’s continuing Red Army Baltic Occupations.
• Potential Baltic citizenships for the >1 million occupiers (settler Russians during the 50-year occupation) were used as political levers by Yeltsin during 1991-94, who linked the Kremlin’s Soviet Troop Withdrawal in Estonia and Latvia to potential Baltic policies of ‘minority rights’ for the Occupiers. Reminder about the demographics at this time: 52% in Latvia and 62% in Estonia.
  • For example: Troop Watch 16-22_Apr_1993.pdf ■ Russia will withdraw its troops from Lithuania by September 1993 in keeping with the agreed timetable, President Boris Yeltsin said while speaking to the diplomatic corps in Moscow on April 9. He said a "political decision" was needed to pull the troops out of Estonia and Latvia where "Russian minorities were being persecuted".
  • More Sources: To find more articles about Yeltsin linking the two: Troop Withdrawal to extra rights for the settler Russians during the 50-year occupation, search on ‘minorities’ in the TBI OCR’d pdfs already available up to August 1993. One of the Kremlin’s favorite propaganda talking points was the ‘human rights violations by the Baltic people against the Russian minorities’. 
• The USA and western countries viewed Baltic citizenships for the >1 million occupiers (settler Russians) as an internal Baltic problem. (see report by Tālavs Jundzis in Latvian)

Now my Troop Watch Results summary.

Preliminary Troop Watch Data Analysis

The three-year Soviet troop withdrawal from the Baltic countries involved heavy rotation via every entry point and transport means with a primary transit through a Kaliningrad corridor. All-the-while, significant numbers of troop personnel remained or integrated locally, which masked the true scale and nature of the troop withdrawal.

Brief Summary

The Troop Watch data shows:

• Withdrawal did not equal full departure
  • Troop numbers dropped, but movement stayed intense
  • Large troop personnel churn
  • Concealed troop retention and absorption into Baltic societies
  • Fresh recruits entered the Baltic states via multi-modal corridors
  • Troop rotations often occurred in smaller groups
  • Russian officers’ attempts to enter were a significant later-phase activity
  • Result: A semi-permanent Russian military diaspora footprint in the Baltic countries
• Organized two-way transit corridors
  • Lithuania was the strategic transit bottleneck, Kaliningrad dependence
  • Latvia functioned as the operational hub: redistribution and staging
  • Estonia was a secondary corridor
  • All corridors show illegal troop entry and onward movement chains
  • Rail corridors were the backbone of troop movement, with air, sea and road providing supplementary troop transit methods. Transit often bypassed legal frameworks.
• Military asset diversion and shadow economic activity

• There might be a location bias in Troop Watch reporting. It would be great to hear from the editors and journalists from TBI at that time how the reports were compiled.

Some Analysis Results Details

Troop Withdrawal vs Troop Rotation. How did it Work?

• Net totals decreased → troops leaving

BUT

• Rotations and replacements during withdrawal
• Units leaving while new personnel entered
• Gross troop movement remained high → large numbers moving in and out

Churn Examples

• Troop Watch: 16-22_Apr_1993.pdf:

• ■ Between March 22 and April 4, Estonian border guards denied entry to 20 Russian troops and three army vehicles travelling without proper permits. A total of 1,390 Russian troops and 96 vehicles left Estonia while 1,122 troops and 87 trucks entered the country legally over the same period.

• Troop_Watch_Sept_24_1993.png

• ■ Between September 6 and 12, Estonian border guards denied entry to 13 Russian troops and two vehicles who lacked proper permits; a total of 412 Russian troops and 20 vehicles entered Estonia legally while 352 troops and 17 vehicles left the country.

The key concept in the ‘Churn Masking Effect’ is the Net Flow = In − Out. To any observers, it looked like troop withdrawal. However, if you count the troop numbers, there is an active troop recycling, with some numbers of troops disappearing into the Baltic countries. I won’t give precise numbers here, as my analysis is preliminary. I do trust the overall pattern, because it is consistent through these months. I invite the intelligence community to make a full, precise counting work. Feel free to contact me.

Routes: Main Transit Corridors Identified

• Primary Corridor: Russia → Latvia → Lithuania → Kaliningrad
  • Functions: troop rotation, equipment movement, Kaliningrad resupply and continuity, transit staging
  • Lithuania functioned as the critical corridor bottleneck with Russian troop rotations strongly tied to Kaliningrad logistics. Lithuania Key nodes: Vilnius garrison, Šiauliai air force installations, Kaunas military facilities
• Secondary Corridor: Russia → Estonia
  • Functions: direct rotations, withdrawal staging
• Secondary Corridor: Estonia → Latvia
  • Functions: direct rotations, southbound redeployment, onward transit
• Staging and Transfer: Latvia → (towards) Kaliningrad
  • Functions: Latvia as a Redistribution Hub, main intake node, redistribution point, staging location for onward transport, illegal onward movement patterns
  • Reflects infrastructure and port/rail capacity advantages. Key destinations and nodes: Liepāja naval base, Riga and railway hub, Daugavpils region, coastal and naval facilities
• Corridor Pressure: Lithuania
  • Troop Watch Data shows: heavy transit traffic, Kaliningrad corridor dependency, legal disputes over transit
• Illegal Entry: → Onward Movement Chains → followed by movement to another location
  • Troop Watch Data patterns include: forged documents, denied entry and detention cases, transit via rail/road without permits suggesting possible covert redeployment strategies

Dominant Transport Modes

• Rail (primary): large troop movements, heavy equipment transport, Kaliningrad corridor
• Road convoys: regional redistribution, short-range movement
• Air transport: rapid rotation and command transport, special personnel transfers
• Sea transport: port withdrawals and equipment removal

Fresh recruits entered the Baltic states via multi-modal corridors

Fresh recruits entered via: naval transport, helicopter and aviation insertion, land convoys, individual vehicles, on rail, and on foot, covert movement disguised in Baltic border guards’ clothes, in civilian clothes, and via cross-border redistribution. Details on the more surprising routes and methods follow:

🚢 Route A — Kaliningrad Maritime Corridor

• Path: Baltijsk (RU) → Liepāja (LV) → Riga (LV) → Paldiski (EE)

• naval delivery of recruits
• denied landing → rerouted landing
• onward transfer to Estonia
• Evidence: Troop Watch in 12-18_Jun_1992.pdf, page 3
• Operational purpose: naval and coastal defense staffing, bypass land border controls, controlled maritime logistics

🚁 Route B — Helicopter Insertion Corridor

• Path: Russia → Pellu village, Alūksne region (LV) → Estonia transfer

• MIG-24 helicopter insertion of recruits
• army truck transport across border
• Evidence: Troop Watch in 12-18_Jun_1992.pdf, page 3
• Operational purpose: rapid deployment, avoid checkpoints and customs monitoring, flexible redistribution

🛫 Route C — Airlift / Corridor Entry (Lithuania)

• Path: Russia → Kazlų Rūda region (LT)

• 8-10 large transport aircraft, each capable of carrying 400 troops, landing with fresh troops
• one AN-2 plane dropping paratroopers
• Evidence: Troop Watch columns in 01-07_May_1992.pdf, page 3; 12-18_Mar_1993.pdf, page 3
• Operational purpose: rapid reinforcement capability, bypass land border controls, concealment and dispersal

🕵️ Route D — Covert Entry

• Path: Latvia → Vilnius (LT)
• disguised OMON personnel as Latvian Border guards
• Evidence: Troop Watch column in 08-14_May_1992.pdf, page 3
• Operational purpose: evade monitoring, concealment

🌲🪖🚶Route E — On Foot Forest Entry

• Path: Latvia → Forested Border →Lithuania
• Russian troops attempted establishment of an illegal border crossing from Latvia to Lithuania through a forest
• Attempt aborted by Lithuanian border guards of the Zagare (LT) checkpoint + Latvian colleagues
• Evidence: Troop Watch column in 05-11_Feb_1993.pdf; page 3
• Operational purpose: evade monitoring, bypass land border controls, concealment and dispersal

Figure 6. In the 05-11 June, 1992 of The Baltic Independent weekly newspaper, on page 3 we see another appropriate cartoon for the Troop Watch column.

Suggestions for More Detailed Analysis

Red Army Troop Absorption: “Disappearing Soldiers” and “Phantom Soldiers”

The Troop Watch data patterns and news of the ‘Phantom Soldiers’ in the file of extra TBI news: Troop_Withdrawal_Followup_September_October_1994.txt indicate that a percentage of Red Army soldiers melted into the Baltic societies.

I suggest that analysts calculate from the Troop Watch data, a ‘disappearing index’ that identifies when Red Army troops likely: remained in Baltic states, entered civilian life, obtained housing or employment, integrated via permits or irregular status, engaged in black-market activity. The indicators from the Troop Watch data include: deserters remaining, business creation or black-market links, pensioner settlement patterns. A high index would equal a high probability of personnel not actually leaving.

A disappearing index could combine:

• Absorption signals: Residence, jobs, housing, pensions
• Illegal/cross-border movement: Transit irregularities
• Churn masking ratio: High movement despite net withdrawal

The highest risk periods could suggest when personnel exited units, but not necessarily the country, and would occur when:

• withdrawal announcements increase
• churn remains high
• absorption indicators spike
• illegal transit increases

Red Army Military Officers

I suggest to especially pay attention to the Red Army officers. Why is this important to know now? These are Kremlin deceptions of the kind to expect in today’s situations when Russia’s armies are located in legal greyzones. In the Baltic societies, these are potential 5^th column risks, one generation later.

Here’s some Troop Watch data that explains why I think this is important. These data were during the period of two months before the Troop Withdrawal deadline.

• Troop_Watch_Jun_17_1994.jpg
  • In the first week of June, 224 Russian military officers and their family members left Estonia with six transport vehicles. At the same time, six vehicles and 181 Russian military officers with family members arrived in Estonia.
• Troop_Watch_Jun_24_1994.jpg
  • According to the Latvian Defence Ministry, the number of Russian troops remaining in Latvia as of June 16 was 3,456 (including 2,908 officers); the number of remaining military units was 112 situated at 129 locations; in addition, there were 5,100 demobilised army officers who had not left the country yet. The remaining armaments included 21 tanks T-72, six armoured cars BRTM and eight armoured personnel carriers BTR, five transport planes and two helicopters.
• Troop_Watch_Jul_22_1994.jpg
  • The number of Russian troops in Estonia is 2,393, most of them officers and non-commissioned officers in and around Tallinn and in Paldiski, according to the Estonian Defence Ministry (July 15).
• Troop_Watch_Aug_5_1994.jpg
  • The number of Russian troops in Estonia on July 26 was estimated between 1,600 and 2,000 by the counterintelligence of the Estonian Defence Forces, the Eesti Ekspress weekly reported on July 28. This includes 900 troops of the 144th division (located in Tallinn, Klooga and Keila), 700 troops in navy units (Tallinn, Paldiski, Ämari), and approximately 400 officers whose units have already been withdrawn.
• Troop_Watch_Aug_5_1994.jpg
  • By 28 July, 2,149 Russian troops (including 1,591 officers) had remained in Latvia, stationed in 48 units on 80 localities, according to the Latvian Defence Ministry. The sources of the Russian Northwestern Group of Forces put the number of remaining troops at 2,428, plus 7,365 family members.
• Troop_Watch_Aug_19_1994.jpg
  • From August 6 to 11, a total of 536 Russian troops left Latvia, according to the Latvian Defence Ministry. As of August 11, the number of remaining troops is put at 1,391 (including 1,010 officers), stationed in 32 military units at 28 locations. Another 5,000 Russian officers are believed to be waiting for orders in Latvia after their units have been disbanded.

With the Red Army officer pensioner and demobilized personnel pathway, we see; retired officers, demobilized servicemen, pensioner settlement, legal residence arrangements. This created a semi-permanent Russian military diaspora footprint.

Figure 7. In the 29 May – 04 June, 1992 of The Baltic Independent weekly newspaper, on page 3, we have the only Troop Watch column with photos.

End Note and Conclusion

I originally intended to only release the five Troop Watch OCR’d compilation files with no additional narrative. However, when I tried to summarize the Troop Watch data in the simplest way, I realized the data was richer and more multidimensional than I thought.

What I presented with the analysis results:

• ‘Churn’,
• Multi-modal transit corridors,
• the surprising variety of methods of insertion of fresh Russian troops, and
• the ‘Disappearance index’

are just the top of the deep well of valuable intelligence information that one can gain from this data.

My preliminary analysis shows that fresh Russian conscript entry points in the Baltic countries were: Baltic sea ports, Baltic airports, military bases not handed over to the Baltic countries yet, Baltic-Russian border train crossings, and vehicle Baltic-Russian border crossings. Fresh Red Army conscripts entered the Baltic countries using the transportation modes: foot, ship, plane, helicopter, train, and vehicles. The fresh conscripts sometimes linked together different transport modes and different border crossings across multiple Baltic countries.

After I presented these routes and transit modes, I suggested approaches to calculate a ‘disappearance index’. This emerged from my own trials from a weekend of playing with the data. I have a spreadsheet with some of this work. Talk to me if this is interesting to you, specially if you have funds that could be allocated to work like this.

Notice that I mentioned in one phrase only: ‘Military asset diversion and shadow economic activity’, but did not go into details. That topic is an analysis and an article all on its own. For example, see the other Themes that emerge from the dataset:

• Russia’s Smuggling, Theft and Illegal Arms Activity, including Diversion to the Black Market
• Russia’s Illegal Equipment Removal and Thefts, including Diversion to the Black Market
• Soviet-Russian Individual Soldiers’ Violent, Disorderly and Intimidation Activities
• Russia’s Political Pressure and Strategic Signaling
• Russian-Baltic Base and Property Conflicts, including unauthorized Russian Live-fire Exercises and Russian Illicit Real Estate Activities
• Soviet-Russian Environmental and Hazardous Legacy Issues

What the Kremlin was doing to the Baltics during the years that the Baltics were supposedly 'free nations’ again, boggles the mind. They were still occupied. The Kremlin will continue to do the same today, at every opportunity when their army is standing in place, no matter what legal structures are supposed to be governing their actions. For example, when the Soviets leave Trans-Dnistr in Moldova, when the War ends in Ukraine, when the Occupation ends in Georgia.

Acknowledgments

I extend my deepest gratitude to Lya Oll, whose work produced the majority of the Troop Watch reports published in The Baltic Independent. Her efforts represent an extraordinary contribution to the documentation of regional security developments.

I also thank editors Asta Trummel and Hennart Arismaa for their essential additional editorial work for the Troop Watch column.

Appreciation is further extended to the main editors of The Baltic Independent for their overall good sense to keep that column running, and the Border Guards and Defense Ministries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose data collection and cooperation made this reporting possible.

Citation

Graps, Amara. The Kremlin’s Useful Chaos: Troop Watch Data from the 1992–1994 Red Army Withdrawal from the Baltic Countries. 2026 NAFOForum.

Supplementary Data

For those who are interested in working with the data, I have a PDF of this article with an additional Appendix, which provides extra data-handling information. You can download the PDF from my Google drive here.