What Are ‘Information Influence Operations’ and How Do They Work?
Information influence operations are organized attempts to manipulate public perception using illegitimate and deceptive means.
These operations are a key part of hybrid threats and cognitive warfare, aimed at weakening political stability, sowing discord, and undermining trust in democratic institutions.
According to the NATO StratCom COE report, Russia employs a variety of tactics to achieve its strategic objectives:
- State-controlled media: Channels like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik act as key vehicles for Russian propaganda, disseminating narratives that align with Kremlin objectives. These platforms target both domestic and international audiences, shaping opinions and distorting facts.
Social media manipulation: Russian influence extends through bot networks, trolls, and fake accounts that amplify divisive content, often infiltrating existing social movements or exploiting sensitive political issues.
Political influence operations: Russia has been known to support extremist political parties, fund campaigns, and use diplomatic channels to manipulate local politics in ways that serve its geopolitical interests.
Cyber operations: Hacking, data leaks, and other cyber-enabled tactics serve to destabilize societies, steal sensitive information, and disrupt democratic processes.
Exploiting societal divisions: Russia targets linguistic, ethnic, historical, and ideological cleavages to deepen internal fractures within states, making them more susceptible to manipulation.
These operations are often covert, deniable, and multi-layered, making them difficult to counter effectively.
Which Countries Are Affected, and How?
The NATO StratCom COE report highlights how Russia tailors its strategies to different Nordic-Baltic countries.
Each country experiences different levels of vulnerability and resistance:
- Denmark: Rather than directly targeting Danish citizens, Russia primarily spreads disinformation about Denmark to undermine its international image. Notably, narratives focus on Greenland’s geopolitical status, Denmark’s military support for Ukraine, and Western “moral decay”—a common theme in Russian propaganda.
Estonia: Russia actively seeks to exploit local Russian-speaking communities and fringe political movements. Even though Estonia banned Russian state media in 2022, Kremlin-backed narratives continue to spread via social media and alternative information channels. Far-right and far-left political forces in Estonia have also adopted elements of pro-Kremlin discourse.
Finland: Historically, Russia portrayed Finland as a neutral and friendly neighbor, but following Finland’s NATO application in 2022, Russian propaganda took a more aggressive tone. Russia has since focused on migration crises, energy dependency, and security fears to dissuade Finnish public support for NATO integration.
Iceland: Iceland is somewhat insulated due to geographic distance and linguistic uniqueness, but its small media landscape and reliance on social media create vulnerabilities. Russian narratives about Iceland tend to be indirect, often woven into broader anti-Western messaging.
Latvia & Lithuania: Russia portrays both states as failed, anti-Russian entities, often using historical grievances related to Soviet heritage to incite division. In Latvia, Russian influence extends through political forces that mirror Kremlin propaganda and memory politics. Lithuania experiences similar tactics, with Russian efforts to frame it as a morally bankrupt, failing state.
Norway: Russia’s Arctic strategy is particularly relevant in Norway. Influence operations here focus on Svalbard, Kirkenes, and Norway’s scientific cooperation with Russia. Russian soft power in Norway is leveraged through economic partnerships and historical narratives.
Sweden: Russian efforts in Sweden have long sought to undermine trust in Swedish institutions. The Kremlin capitalizes on debates surrounding immigration, crime, and Sweden’s NATO accession to create polarization and skepticism toward Western alliances.
Despite variations in approach, the overarching goal remains the same: to weaken unity and democratic resilience in the region.
What Are Some Real Examples of Russian Influence Operations?
The NATO StratCom COE report provides detailed case studies illustrating how Russia employs different methods to influence specific countries.
These examples show how disinformation, covert operations, and media manipulation are used to shape narratives and undermine trust.
- The Greenlandic Letter (Denmark, 2019): A forged letter, allegedly written by a Greenlandic politician to a U.S. senator, was leaked online to suggest that Greenland was seeking independence from Denmark with U.S. backing. The operation aimed to sow discord between Greenland, Denmark, and the United States, exploiting geopolitical tensions surrounding the Arctic.
Anti-Vaccine to Anti-Ukraine Narratives (Denmark, 2022): Russian-aligned disinformation networks that previously spread COVID-19 vaccine skepticism pivoted to amplifying anti-Ukraine and pro-Kremlin narratives. These networks exploited conspiracy theory communities that had already been primed to distrust mainstream media and Western governments.
‘Russian Prank’ Targeting a Danish Minister (Denmark, 2023): A Russian prankster posed as an African diplomat and tricked Denmark’s Foreign Minister into a conversation where sensitive topics were discussed. The goal was to undermine trust in Danish state institutions, embarrass government officials, and spread doubt within Denmark’s pro-Ukraine stance.
Svalbard & Arctic Narratives (Norway): Russia has used historical treaties and economic partnerships to stir debates over Arctic sovereignty, particularly in Svalbard and Kirkenes. Russian media and political figures have pushed the idea that Norway is violating agreements by restricting Russian activities in the Arctic, an effort aimed at weakening Norwegian sovereignty claims and NATO unity.
Latvia’s ‘Failed State’ Narrative: Russian propaganda continuously portrays Latvia as an economically and politically unstable country controlled by the West. Kremlin-affiliated media regularly amplify stories suggesting that Latvia discriminates against Russian speakers and that its economy is in decline due to its EU and NATO membership. This messaging is designed to create social division and weaken national cohesion.
These examples highlight the breadth of Russia’s influence operations, which range from forged diplomatic documents to sophisticated media campaigns.
Each case demonstrates how Russia adapts its tactics to the specific vulnerabilities of each country.
How Are Nordic-Baltic Countries Fighting Back?
Governments in the region have adopted proactive measures to counter Russian influence, employing a combination of media regulation, cyber defenses, intelligence cooperation, public resilience programs, and legal frameworks:
Blocking and Restricting Russian State Media
Several countries, particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have restricted access to Russian state-controlled media such as Sputnik and RT. These measures significantly reduce the reach of Kremlin narratives within the region.
Lithuania, for instance, has not only blocked access but also suspended the broadcasts of major Russian television channels, ensuring that pro-Kremlin messaging is minimized.
Strengthening Media Literacy and Public Resilience
Nordic and Baltic nations have implemented education programs and public awareness campaigns to equip citizens with critical thinking skills to identify disinformation.
Finland, often ranked as one of the most media-literate countries in the world, has integrated media literacy into its school curricula, helping students recognize and counteract misleading narratives.
Sweden and Denmark have also expanded efforts to educate journalists and civil society groups on how to combat foreign influence campaigns.
Enhancing Cyber Defenses and Counterintelligence Measures
Given that cyber warfare is a key component of Russia’s influence operations, countries like Latvia, Estonia, and Finland have strengthened their cybersecurity frameworks.
Estonia, a leader in digital defense, has developed sophisticated cyber monitoring systems to detect and neutralize Russian hacking attempts before they can cause disruption.
Denmark has also reported increased Russian cyber activities targeting its political and industrial sectors, prompting the Danish government to strengthen digital infrastructure protections.
International Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing
Nordic-Baltic countries have worked closely with NATO, the EU, and regional partners to share intelligence and coordinate responses to Russian influence operations.
This includes real-time tracking of disinformation campaigns and cyber threats. Sweden and Finland’s recent NATO accession has further strengthened collective security efforts, allowing for greater military and intelligence coordination.
Countering Financial Networks Supporting Influence Operations
Countries like Lithuania and Norway have cracked down on Russian-affiliated financial networks and proxy organizations suspected of funding influence campaigns.
By tightening financial regulations and sanctioning pro-Kremlin entities, they aim to disrupt the economic underpinnings of Russian disinformation efforts.
Legal and Policy Measures Against Foreign Influence
Several nations have enacted legislation to criminalize foreign interference in political processes.
Estonia and Latvia, for instance, have introduced laws making it illegal for individuals or organizations to knowingly disseminate foreign propaganda.
This legal framework enables governments to take swift action against entities engaged in influence operations.
Despite these measures, the NATO report warns that Russia continues to evolve its tactics, shifting towards more clandestine methods such as using proxy organizations, indirect funding of media outlets, and leveraging social movements to amplify its messaging.
Therefore, continued vigilance, adaptability, and international cooperation remain critical in countering Russian influence.
How Can Democracies Stay Ahead?
The Nordic-Baltic region serves as a frontline in the fight against Russian influence operations, but its collective resilience provides valuable lessons for other democracies facing similar threats.
The key takeaways from the NATO StratCom COE report include:
- Disinformation is highly adaptable: Russia’s narratives quickly shift based on geopolitical events, meaning governments must remain flexible in their countermeasures.
Societal resilience is the best defense: Countries with strong media literacy, transparent governance, and well-informed citizens are far less susceptible to influence operations.
A coordinated, multi-layered response is essential: Blocking hostile media, strengthening cybersecurity, and fostering intelligence cooperation are all necessary elements of an effective defense.
Democratic values must be protected: The fight against disinformation is not just about countering propaganda but also about preserving free speech, critical thinking, and democratic discourse.
The report underscores that no country is immune to information warfare, and as Russia refines its strategies, so must democratic nations.
The Nordic-Baltic region has demonstrated proactive and innovative ways to counter these threats, setting a precedent for the rest of the world.
What we can see is that awareness, education, and collaboration will be the defining factors in protecting democratic societies from foreign manipulation.
By staying vigilant, adaptable, and united, democracies can prevent external actors from exploiting societal divisions and eroding public trust.
Sources:
This article is based on findings from “Russia’s Information Influence Operations in the Nordic-Baltic Region” by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2024).
For further reading, visit www.stratcomcoe.org.
